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Abstract
When referring to an object using a description, speak-
ers need to select properties which jointly distinguish
it from any potential distractors. Previous empirical
and computational work addressing this content selec-
tion process has highlighted the role of both (i) the dis-
criminatory power of properties of a referent, i.e. how
many of the distractors in a domain each property ex-
cludes; (ii) how inherently salient or preferred a property
is. To date, there has been no attempt to systematically
investigate the trade-off between these two potentially
competing motivations. This paper investigates experi-
mentally the extent to which speakers take discrimina-
tory power versus preference into account during con-
tent selection for reference production. Our results sug-
gest that discriminatory power in fact plays a relatively
unimportant role. We discuss the implications of this
for computational models of reference production.
Keywords: Referring expressions, language produc-
tion, psycholinguistics, computational modelling
Introduction
Referring expressions such as the large bottle are an es-
sential feature of communication. Without the ability to
refer, it would be difficult to ground our communicative
efforts in the physical and mental world. The processes
underlying reference production have been the object of
intensive study by researchers in Computational Linguis-
tics (see Krahmer & van Deemter, 2012, for an extensive
review) and Experimental Psycholinguistics (e.g. Lev-
elt, 1989; Arnold, 2008). Many researchers agree that
the primary aim of a referring expression is to identify
an object for an interlocutor, a position that is rooted
in a long tradition of philosophical work on the subject
(e.g. Searle, 1969).
Consider a situation in which a speaker needs to iden-
tify an object (the target referent), which has not been
introduced earlier in the discourse and which is visu-
ally co-present for both speaker and listener. Here, the
speaker needs to perform content selection, to determine
which properties of the target referent to mention in a
description. This process is non-trivial because objects
have several properties to choose from; moreover, the
goal of identification entails choosing a set of properties
that jointly exclude all the distractors in the domain with
which a listener might confuse the target. The speaker
has to tread a fine line between efficiency on the one hand
and sufficient detail on the other. Thus, it would seem
desirable to avoid producing an overspecified description
which contains more properties than required, or an un-
derspecified one, which does not succeed in identifying
the target. Both constraints would seem to follow to the
extent that speakers observe Grice’s Maxim of Quantity
(Grice, 1975).
To take an example, the bottle with the black border
in Figure 1 has three properties that are potentially dis-
tinguishing, namely, its colour, its size and the fact that
it is marked with a black diamond (hereafter referred to
as its pattern). On its own, none of these properties is
sufficient to distinguish it from the distractors, the other
bottles in the domain. Closer inspection reveals that
this target minimally requires two properties (in fact,
any two of these three) for successful identification. For
example, the large bottle with a diamond would do the
trick without overspecifying.
Figure 1: Example domain: the target’s diamond pat-
tern excludes 4 distractors, while its green colour ex-
cludes the 3 blue bottles on the bottom row
Models of content selection
What process would best model speakers’ content selec-
tion procedure? It is widely accepted that, since speech
production is incremental (cf. Levelt, 1989; Pechmann,
1989), properties would be selected one after the other.
The main question is: on what basis is the choice made
at each point? One possibility would be for the speaker
to weigh each property in terms of its discriminatory
power. For instance, looking at Figure 1, it is easy to see
that starting with the target’s pattern would eliminate
four distractors, while either of the other two properties
would eliminate only three. Hence, a possible strategy
for a speaker might be to always select the most dis-
criminatory property, given the state of the domain and
the description. In this case, once a pattern is chosen,
either one of the remaining two properties (colour or
size) would suffice to completely distinguish the target,
since their discriminatory power is equal. This strategy
is embodied in a well-known computational algorithm
for the automatic generation of referring expressions, the
Greedy heuristic (Dale, 1989). In the psycholinguistic
community, it has been proposed most explicitly in the
theoretical work of Olson (1970). Olson suggested that
speakers ‘specify the object to the level required by the
listener to differentiate the intended referent from the
alternatives’ (p. 244-5). One way of interpreting this,
assuming an incremental procedure, is that the speaker
weighs the contribution of each available property to the
ultimate goal of identification, choosing the one that is
most likely to help in achieving it, as the Greedy heuris-
tic does. 1
In contrast to these models, experimental work has
suggested that speakers’ content selection processes tend
to rely on heuristics related to the inherent salience of
certain properties. The primary source of evidence for
this is that some properties – notably an object’s colour
– tend to be used even when they do not contribute to
the identification of a target, leading to an overspecified
description. By contrast, other properties, such as size
(or, presumably, pattern in the sense being used here),
tend to be used only when absolutely required. In the
case of size, its relatively dispreferred status is likely due
to its being a relative property, requiring comparison to
other objects in the domain.
These results are extremely robust (see Pechmann,
1It is worth noting that the Greedy heuristic is not the
only model that seeks to account for Olson’s theoretical
stance. A possible alternative is not to proceed incremen-
tally, but to compare entire descriptions of increasing length,
starting from those consisting of a single property, until the
target is distinguishing. This would ensure a description that
contains no more information than is absolutely required,
something the Greedy heuristic can in fact only approxi-
mate. However, this ‘Full Brevity’ model, also discussed by
Dale (1989), is unlikely to be psycholinguistically realistic,
for three reasons: (i) it is computationally extremely expen-
sive, since it potentially involves search through all available
combinations of properties (Reiter, 1990); (ii) speakers tend
to overspecify, as we discuss below; (iii) an implementation
of Dale’s Full Brevity model has been shown to produce out-
put that does not match that of human speakers, compared
to algorithms that are incremental in nature (van Deemter,
Gatt, van der Sluis, & Power, 2012).
1989; Belke & Meyer, 2002; Engelhardt, Bailey, & Fer-
reira, 2006, among many others) and appear to persist
even when the colour of an object doesn’t differ too
starkly from that of its distractors (e.g. the target is
light green, whereas a distractor is a darker shade of
green; see Viethen, Goudbeek, & Krahmer, 2012). Ac-
cording to Pechmann (1989), this can be explained with
reference to the fact that when speakers incrementally
select properties, they initiate their descriptions before
having completely scanned a domain. The preference for
a property like colour – which may be related to its being
an inherently salient attribute of perceived objects (e.g.
Pechmann, 1989) – would make it more likely for that
property to be selected before others.
In short, the evidence suggests that a property’s dis-
criminatory value is not the only consideration in content
selection. In the computational literature, this evidence
inspired the development of the well-known Incremen-
tal Algorithm for the generation of referring expressions
(Dale & Reiter, 1995). In contrast to the Greedy heuris-
tic, the Incremental procedure works by selecting prop-
erties one by one on the basis of their preference rather
than their discriminatory value. Given an ordering of
properties by their preference, the algorithm considers
each in turn. If a property excludes some distractors,
it is included in the description, and the distractor set
is updated, before considering the next property. Like
the Greedy heuristic, this algorithm terminates when the
description is fully distinguishing.
In our example domain, the Incremental Algorithm
would thus start with the target’s colour rather than
its pattern. This excludes all the blue objects, leaving
two other green objects. If, in the predefined preference
ordering, pattern follows colour, this is the next property
that would be considered. Since pattern excludes both
remaining distractors, the description generated is the
green bottle with a diamond.
Thus, there are two potentially conflicting motivations
underlying content selection: discriminatory power and
preference. The potential trade-off is exemplified in Fig-
ure 1, where the most discriminatory property (pattern)
is not the most preferred one (colour).
In spite of the evidence for preferences stemming from
overspecification, there is to our knowledge no research
that explicitly tests the predictions of the two models, al-
though some of the implications of the two strategies are
evident in recent computational psycholinguistic work.
Gatt, van Gompel, Krahmer, and van Deemter (2011)
and van Gompel, Gatt, Krahmer, and van Deemter
(2012) propose a non-deterministic model of reference
production called pro, which follows one of two differ-
ent paths, each of which involves the throw of a dice,
loaded to reflect the degree of preference of a set of prop-
erties. Path 1 is only followed if there exists a property
that rules out all distractors (the limiting case of what
we have called discriminatory power): the output of the
algorithm in this case is a description containing this
one property. Should several properties rule out all dis-
tractors then the (preference-loaded) dice is thrown to
choose one of them. Path 2 is followed if no such prop-
erty exists (as in Figure 1). Here, properties are added
incrementally to the description until all distractors have
been removed. Which property is chosen next is based
on a throw of the dice. Once all distractors have been
removed, however, the dice is thrown again to determine
whether to terminate or include one more property; if the
latter decision is taken, then the dice is thrown again to
decide whether to terminate after that, or continue, and
so on.Thus, preference does not only govern the choice
between properties, it also governs the decision whether
or not to over-specify.
Although pro was found to have an excellent fit to
production data, it was compared to human-produced
descriptions in very simple domains in which there were
only two properties available (colour and size) and one
property always sufficed to distinguish the target ref-
erent. Thus, it is an open question whether speakers
computed relative discriminatory power, or more simply
based their strategy on the limiting case, namely, the
availability of a fully distinguishing property.
More recently, Frank and Goodman (2012) proposed
a Bayesian model to predict property choice2 in very
simple language games in which a speaker has to choose
one property (such as blue vs. circle) to describe an ob-
ject in a domain. Although this work does not explicitly
address identification, it is nevertheless highly relevant
to the present discussion. In this model, the speaker’s
choice of a property given a referent is based on utility.
Letting p be some property of the referent, P the set
of available properties, and |p| stand for the number of
objects of which p is true, the likelihood of using p is
|p|−1∑
q∈P |q|−1
This definition approaches the notion of discrimina-
tory power being discussed here, because the utility of
p increases the fewer objects it is true of (i.e. the more
distractors it eliminates). However, this model does not
consider preference. A more serious shortcoming is that
the model assumes that a speaker can only refer using
a single property; thus, it would never overspecify. In-
deed, it turns out that the utility function over-estimates
speakers’ tendency to underspecify. Consider a case
where a referent is both large and green. Assume that
there is an additional green distractor, but no other large
distractors (size is fully distinguishing). In this case, the
probability of using the property large works out to 0.67,
2Frank and Goodman (2012)’s discussion employs the
term word rather than property; however, little hinges on the
difference for present purposes.
with a probability of 0.33 for green. In the experiment
reported by Gatt et al. (2011), which contained a condi-
tion precisely analogous to this one, speakers produced
size-only descriptions only 17% of the time, and over-
specified with both size and colour 83% of the time, a
finding that tallies with figures in the literature on over-
specification. Speakers never produced an underspecified
description with colour only. Thus, the model of Frank
and Goodman too does not satisfactorily account for the
interplay between discriminatory power and preference.
In summary, the question addressed by the present
paper is: To what extent do preferences trump discrimi-
nation in the process of selecting properties incremen-
tally? We investigate the issue experimentally, using
domains such as the one exemplified above. If speak-
ers tend to prioritise properties by discriminatory power,
then a property should be more often included if it is the
most discriminatory one available, than if it is not. By
contrast, if speakers prioritise properties by preference,
then more preferred properties should be included more
often than less salient properties.
The experiment
The experiment traded off the discriminatory power of
properties against their degree of preference, which was
determined on the basis of previous empirical work. Our
aim was to investigate which of the two heuristics out-
lined in the preceding discussions – one that prioritises
properties based on preference, or one that does so based
on discriminatory power – best matches speakers’ con-
tent selection strategies. If preferences are more impor-
tant, then the frequency with which properties are used
should be independent of how discriminatory they are
in different conditions. By contrast, if discriminatory
power is more important, then a property should be used
more often in case it is more discriminatory, regardless
of whether it is highly preferred (as colour is) or not.
Participants
The experiment was conducted at the Tilburg center for
Cognition and Communication. 72 native speakers of
Dutch (49 female, 23 male), all undergraduate students
at Tilburg University, participated in return for course
credit. All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and
none reported any problems with colour perception.
Materials and design
The experimental stimuli consisted of 36 items selected
from a version of the Snodgrass and Vanderwart set of
line drawings with colour and texture (Rossion & Pour-
tois, 2004). The items were selected on the basis of a
pretest in which seven native speakers of Dutch were
asked to name greyscale versions of the pictures. For the
items, we selected only those pictures for which at least
5 out of the 7 speakers agreed on the name of the object.
The pictures were subsequently manipulated to create a
version of each in two different sizes (large/small) and
four different colours (red, blue, green and grey), with
three superimposed patterns (a circle, a diamond or a
square).
The rationale for using these three properties was as
follows. First, there is a lot of previous work indicat-
ing that colour is highly preferred over size (see above).
Second, the choice of pattern as the third property was
based on its having to be realised (in Dutch, the lan-
guage of the experiment) as a post-modifier, while size
and colour tend to be realised as pre-modifiers, with a
relatively fixed order (see e.g. Gatt et al., 2011, for previ-
ous work manipulating colour and size with similar ma-
terials). To the extent that the syntactic linearisation
of properties reflects their order of selection, this would
suggest that pattern would be selected after the other
two. Be that as it may, however, we wanted to ensure
minimal variation in syntactic ordering of the properties
involved.
For each item, a visual domain was constructed, con-
sisting of a target referent indicated by a black border,
and five distractors. In each domain, all objects (target
and distractors) were of the same type (e.g. all were bot-
tles). In every domain, the target could be minimally dis-
tinguished from its distractors via any subset of two of its
properties. As an example, the bottle in Figure 1 can be
distinguished from its distractors by using its colour and
pattern (the green bottle with a diamond), its colour and
size (the large green bottle) or its size and pattern (the
large bottle with a diamond). Each item was used in one
of three conditions; the difference between conditions lay
in which property of the target had the highest discrim-
inatory value. One property was designated the most
discriminatory property (hereafter mdp): this property
excluded four of the distractors. The other two proper-
ties were equally discriminatory and each excluded three
distractors. For example, in Figure 1, the mdp is pat-
tern.
Note that, regardless of which property was the mdp,
two properties were always minimally needed to distin-
guish the target. A description which mentioned all
three properties would be overspecified, while one that
mentioned only one property would be underspecified.
As a result, there is no length confound: distinguish-
ing descriptions are equally long in all conditions, unless
they are over- or underspecified. This setup excludes
another possibility, namely that speakers are biased to
select a single, fully distinguishing property if one ex-
ists. This could happen, for example, because when a
target has such a property (e.g. the target is the only
red object), it becomes so salient that it induces a ‘pop-
out’ effect (Treisman & Gelade, 1980). While such ef-
fects have been reported in experiments on visual search,
they have recently also been found to influence reference
production as well (Gatt, van Gompel, Krahmer, & van
Deemter, 2012). Here we are interested in testing a sub-
tler notion of discriminatory power, in a more complex
domain configuration.
In each trial, objects were presented in a sparse grid.
For each item, the position of the target was fixed in ad-
vance and was the same in all conditions. Both items and
participants were randomly divided into 3 groups. Item
and participant groups were rotated through a Latin
square so that each item appeared in each condition and
each participant saw all conditions, but each participant
saw each item only once. The experiment consisted of 36
trials, with 108 fillers. 36 of these were constructed using
the objects with the same three properties as those used
in the experiment. However, the type of a target sufficed
to distinguish the target. The remaining 72 fillers con-
sisted of targets that could be distinguished from their
distractors using a variety of properties (such as stripes,
spots etc).
Procedure
The experiment was run using dmdx (Forster & Forster,
2003), and used a director-matcher paradigm. Partic-
ipants were divided into 36 pairs, with one randomly
assigned to the role of speaker/director and the other to
the role of listener/matcher. Participants did not switch
roles. The director and matcher faced each other; each
had a computer screen that could not be seen by the
other. The speaker used a keyboard to request an item,
whereupon she identified the target for the listener, who
clicked on the target on his own screen. Participants
were instructed to keep the interaction to a minimum,
with the listener only responding by indicating to the
speaker that he had finished identifying the target. The
speaker’s descriptions were recorded through a headset.
Data coding
Descriptions were transcribed and coded according to
which of the three properties of a target (colour, size
and/or pattern) were mentioned. This classification ig-
nored the mention of the object’s type (e.g. ‘bottle’),
which we assumed would be included in any case and
which, in our design, had no discriminatory value. A
description was further classified as follows (i) Well-
specified if it contained exactly two properties (exclud-
ing type) of the target; Overspecified if it mentioned all
three properties; or (iii) Underspecified if it mentioned
only one property, or only the object’s type. The de-
scriptions were further coded according to whether they
included the mdp or not.
Results
In what follows, we report results from logit mixed ef-
fects (lme) analyses with Condition as fixed effect and
random intercepts for participants and items.
Table 1 displays the proportion of overspecified, well-
specified and underspecified descriptions in each condi-
mdp Well-spec Overspec Underspec
Colour 0.699 0.296 0.005
Size 0.685 0.310 0.005
Pattern 0.676 0.324 0.000
Table 1: Proportion of well-specified, overspecified and un-
derspecified descriptions, by condition
tion. The number of underspecified descriptions was
minimal overall (4 in total) and the rate of overspecifica-
tion does not appear to differ greatly across conditions.
We recoded descriptions to indicate whether each one
was overspecified or not. There was no effect of condition
on the likelihood of overspecification (Z = 1.02, p > .3),
that is, the likelihood of overspecifying did not depend
on which property was the mdp.
mdp Colour Size Pattern
Colour 0.99 0.73 0.57
Size 0.99 0.76 0.55
Pattern 0.99 0.73 0.59
Table 2: Proportion of descriptions containing colour, size
and pattern (columns) in each condition (rows)
Table 2 displays the proportion of descriptions con-
taining colour, size or pattern, in each condition. There
are two striking facts about the data: (i) the frequency
with which any of the three properties was used was
largely independent of the condition, that is, whether
that property was the most discriminatory one or not;
(ii) there is clear evidence for preferences, with colour
being used more frequently than size, and size more fre-
quently than pattern.
An lme analysis showed a highly significant effect of
condition on the likelihood with which participants used
the mdp (Z = −4.33, p < .001); this effect was also
found when the analysis was repeated focusing only on
well-specified descriptions, that is, those containing two
of the three properties (Z = 4.38, p < .001). The results
show quite unambiguously that whether or not the mdp
was used turned out to depend on whether it was colour,
size or pattern. This is a clear indication that preference
trumps discriminatory power, not the other way round.
Discussion
Our results suggest that speakers are insensitive to subtle
differences in the discriminatory power of properties, re-
lying on preference-based heuristics. Previous work has
gleaned evidence for such heuristics from overspecifica-
tion data, which is further used to argue against the no-
tion that speakers observe a strict interpretation of the
Gricean Maxim of Quantity. The present experiment
manipulated both property preference (by contrasting
colour, size, pattern) and discriminatory power (by or-
thogonally manipulating whether each of these proper-
ties is most discriminatory).
The evidence shows that preference has an effect on
how frequently a property is chosen, but speakers are rel-
atively insensitive to subtle differences in discriminatory
power. We draw this conclusion from the clear tendency
to make selections on the basis of which property is in-
volved, rather than its contrastive value. Thus, colour,
for example, is highly preferred and tends to be chosen
irrespective of its discriminatory power. It is possible
that the marked preference for colour is due to the fact
that in our domains (e.g. 1), it becomes more salient
since it characterises the entire object (e.g. a bottle is
green in its entirety), whereas pattern, for example, does
not. However, the consistency of our results in this re-
gard with previous work (e.g. Pechmann, 1989; Belke &
Meyer, 2002) suggests that the colour preference reflects
a more general tendency.
The findings directly contradict computational mod-
els such as the Greedy heuristic (Dale, 1989), as well as
proposals in the psycholinguistic literature based on the-
oretical work such as that of Olson (1970). In contrast, it
suggests that models such as the Incremental Algorithm
(Dale & Reiter, 1995) are on the right track, insofar as
they make choices based on preference. On the other
hand, recent work suggests that this algorithm does not
give a complete picture of human reference production
either. One of its limitations is that it only selects a prop-
erty if it excludes some of the (remaining) distractors at
a given point in the procedure, something that has been
shown not to hold of human speakers (Viethen, Dale, &
Guhe, 2011). Another is that the procedure is entirely
deterministic and always produces the same output for a
given input and a given preference ordering among avail-
able properties. In contrast, human speakers appear to
treat the notion of preference stochastically, so that a
model that interprets preferences in terms of a proba-
bility distribution fits human data better (Gatt et al.,
2011).
This brings us to our earlier discussion of probabilistic
models. One interesting question is raised by the pro
model of van Gompel et al. (2012). This model first tries
to find a property which fully distinguishes the target ref-
erent. Additional content selection decisions are carried
out probabilistically based on preference. As we have
discussed, this model has been shown to have a remark-
ably good fit to data elicited from human speakers, albeit
in much simpler domains than the ones used here. Now,
a possible generalisation of this model would be one that
first looks for the most discriminatory property available,
rather than a fully distinguishing one. The results of the
present experiment, which explicitly excluded the pos-
sibility of there being a single distinguishing property
for the target, suggest that this would not improve its
goodness of fit. However, it should be noted that our
results are based on domains in which the difference in
discriminatory power between the most distinguishing
property and the others is exactly 1. Would a greater
difference motivate speakers to select the mdp, even if
it was highly dispreferred? A positive answer to this
question would imply that the pro model can indeed be
generalised to look for highly discriminatory properties,
but only if their discriminatory value was relatively high,
making them very visually salient. Thus, sensitivity to
discriminatory power might fall on a continuum.
A similar point can be made about Frank and Good-
man (2012)’s Bayesian model, which estimates the likeli-
hood of a property being used for a referent as a function
of the number of potential referents of that property, and
the number of properties that the referent may be dis-
tinguished by. Modulo the simplification inherent in this
work, namely that referents are to be distinguished using
a single property, it would be interesting to investigate
to what extent this notion of utility is also gradable and
impacts visual salience.
Conclusions and future work
This paper investigated content selection in reference
production. It addressed the possible trade-off between
(i) the discriminatory power of a property, that is, the
extent to which it is likely to help in the task of distin-
guishing a referent from its distractors and (ii) the extent
to which a property is preferred. Our results suggest
that subtle differences in discriminatory power do not
influence content selection choices. One question that
is left open by the present work is whether larger dis-
criminatory power differences would alter these findings,
something that we plan to investigate in future work.
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